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THE WHISKEY TAX OF 1791 AND THE
CONSEQUENT INSURRECTION:
"A WICKED AND HAPPY TUMULT"
Abstract: This paper examines the development of the Whiskey Tax
of 1791 and its criticality in the funding of early federal government
debt and operations. By considering some of the provisions of the
tax and the collection and enforcement procedures, the financial and
social impacts of the Whiskey Tax are clarified. Civil disobedience in
resisting the tax and the “Whiskey Rebellion” of 1794 are explored in
that context. Whether the Whiskey Tax effectively served as the first
income tax is considered. Images of original record documents are
included.

INTRODUCTION
Just where he hung the people meet.
To see him swing was music sweet.
A Barrel of whiskey at his feet.1
In March of 1791, the first Congress of the United States
passed An Act Repealing, after the Last Day of June Next, the Duties Heretofore Laid upon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad,
and Laying Others in their Stead, and Also upon Spirits Distilled
within the United States and for Appropriating the Same [U.S.
Senate Journal, February 10, 1791; U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 338 –
355]. This law, the “Whiskey Tax,” placed an excise tax on spirits
1
Poem from anti-excise cartoon by an unknown artist depicting the lynching
of a revenue agent, 1792, located at the Atwater Kent Museum of Philadelphia
History.
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distilled in the United States and became the first tax ever levied
by the United States on a domestic product [review of The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the U.S….March 3, 1789
– March 3, 1791]. The excise tax was immediately controversial,
and resistance developed into the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, an
insurrection that has achieved almost mythic status.
This paper will examine the development and purpose of
the Whiskey Tax. It will also discuss the distilled spirits operations in Pennsylvania and neighboring states at the time of the
tax, the financial impact of the excise, and briefly examine the
Whiskey Rebellion. An argument will be made that the Whiskey
Tax, rather than being purely an excise tax, effectively served as
the country’s first income tax.
TAXATION IN THE 1780S
The post-Revolution U.S. government operated under the
Articles of Confederation, which granted no power to levy taxes.
Strapped for the cash needed to pay for the significant expenditures related to the Revolution, the Continental Congress accepted loans from France. In order to pay off those loans and to
meet federal expenses, the early government had the choice of
either printing more money or obtaining other loans. Levying
taxes was not an option, both due to a lack of legal authority to
do so and the political caution that balked at alienating the citizens of the fledgling American country who had just gone to war
with the British over the issue of taxes. Those state governments
who required their citizens to pay taxes experienced strong, and
sometimes violent, protests against the administration of taxation, such as Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts [Becker, 1980].
Congress did print money, which led to hyperinflation, and
interest rates on state and federal debt rose to the dreadful level
of 5 to 12 percent per month [Penna. Gen. Assembly, 1785]. The
government struggled to pay off the loans from France, stopping
payment of interest in 1785, and defaulting on installments due
in 1787 [U.S. Dept. of State, undated]. The country had also borrowed from the Spanish government and Dutch investors, and
was in a precarious financial state. Scholars estimate that federal debt in 1787 exceeded $54 million [Chernow, 2004, p. 297],
coupled with state debt of $25 million [Anderson, 1983], and
U.S. Treasury Department data confirm that federal debt was
well over $75 million by January 1791 [Congress Senate Committee Report, 1790; U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, undated]. Robert
Morris, whom George Washington called “the invaluable …
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financier of the Revolution” [Custis and Custis Lee 1861, 328],
in acknowledgement of the substantial personal credit extended
on behalf of the patriots, was already headed toward bankruptcy
and debtor’s prison and had no further means with which to
help the federal government.
Following the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, its subsequent ratification by eleven states, and the election of George
Washington as President, the nascent government of the United
States began operating January 1, 1789, complete with the
“power to lay and collect taxes” [U.S. Constitution art.1, sec. 8,
cl. 1]. Edling [2003] argues that the very writing of this Constitution was a defining moment, creating the American equivalent
of a European fiscal-military state, with the ability to tax and the
responsibility to defend its citizens.
The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton,
championed a peacetime tax regime based on tariffs and
tonnage fees2 [Hamilton, 1787]. In its first two sessions, the
Congress adopted tariffs on a wide variety of imported goods,
including wine, tea, coffee, hemp, shoes, china and glassware,
clothing, and hammered or rolled iron [An Act for Laying a Duty
…, 1789; An Act Imposing Duties …, 1789]. Pelatiah Webster,
a Philadelphia merchant and economist, argued that those
customs duties were “voluntary” taxes, since no person was
“compelled to pay any of the taxes, unless he chooses to be
concerned in the articles taxed” [Webster, 1791, p. 468], most
of which were considered luxury goods. Since they were duties
on articles of consumption, such taxes might affect patterns of
consumption but did not touch the property of citizens in the
way a direct tax would, and there was no threat of tax debts or
foreclosure from such imposts.
While many are of the opinion that these import tariffs
were intended to protect the fragile manufacturing industries
in the new nation, there was substantial debate even at the
time about whether these tariffs should be for revenue-raising
purposes alone or to strike back against those countries that
imposed barriers against U.S. goods [Debates and Proceedings
of the Congress of the U.S….March 3, 1789 – March 3, 1791].
That debate pitted Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton against
2
The First Session of the 1st Congress passed tariffs on imported goods, primarily those from France and England, and tonnage (weight) fees on cargo navigation superseding those imposed by individual states. James Madison led the
passage of these acts supported by strong arguments from Hamilton, and then
“actively promoted” Hamilton’s appointment to head the new Treasury Department [Miller, 1960].
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Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and his ally James Madison. Hamilton strongly advocated non-discriminatory import
duties to raise revenue to finance government expenditures
and fund the public debt, in contrast to Jefferson and Madison
who sought to impose countervailing restrictions reciprocating
Britain’s treatment of U.S. goods. Domestic manufacturers were
disappointed with Hamilton’s proposed moderate tariffs, since
they were not adequate to discourage imports [Irwin, 2004].
Ultimately, the revenue-raising aspect of import duties seems to
have prevailed. In 1792, one of the few years for which data are
available, the customs duties collected accounted for about $3.4
million of the $3.7 million federal government receipts [Nourse,
1838], indicating the criticality of those duties to support federal
spending and debt service.
Despite the substantial tariffs on imported goods, there
remained a considerable shortfall between income and expenditures. Duties from the first tariff acts consisted of three
parts: specific duties on 36 particular “luxury” commodities not
produced in the United States, ad valorem duties on most other
imports, and duty-free treatment for seventeen goods considered
necessities such as saltpeter and brass. In order to address the
revenue shortfall, the specific duties were “fine tuned” almost
immediately to provide additional income [Irwin, 2003]. The
Tariff Act of 1790 increased the 1789 duty on wine, tea, coffee,
and many spices by 50 percent or more, among other adjustments [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 330 – 336]. Many duties were
further raised by the Tariff of 1792 [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 355 –
361], explicitly to fund military expenditures to protect the western frontier, offering additional support to the revenue-raising
purpose of import duties.
THE LEVYING OF THE WHISKEY TAX
Despite the additional import duties imposed by the Tariff Act of 1790, a substantial federal deficit remained. Actual
federal operating and debt expenditures were less than federal
income, and would have resulted in a government surplus, had
it not been for the federal assumption of state debts related
to the revolution [Congress “Assumption Bill,” 1790]. Federal
expenditures in 1792 amounted to approximately $5.1 million,
yet government revenue for that year was only $3.7 million [Irwin, 2009, p.19], resulting in a deficit of about $1.4 million, or
27 percent of the federal budget. The U.S. was able to cover its
revenue shortfall only through a sizeable loan from the Nether-
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lands [Riley, 1978]. Interest on the debt alone amounted to more
than $2.8 million per year [Hamilton, 1790]. With a considerable
need for additional revenue, Hamilton revisited an idea initially
broached in his Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of
Public Credit – the idea of a duty on spirits distilled within the
United States. Hamilton argued that the monies raised would
facilitate a properly managed national debt and “render [a national debt] a national blessing” [Hamilton, 1790].
There are multiple reasons Hamilton targeted distilled spirits rather than other domestic products. First, Hamilton [1790]
argued in his Report … of Public Credit that distilled spirits were
not a necessity but a luxury item – a “national extravagance”
– that was only consumed by those who, by logical inference,
could afford to pay the new tax. Not only are distilled spirits
luxury items, Hamilton alleges they are inelastic in demand:
“Experience has shewn, that luxuries of every kind, lay the
strongest hold on the attachments of mankind, which, especially
when confirmed by habit, are not easily alienated from them.”
Since demand is inelastic, merchants will not suffer as a result
of the imposition of “considerable duties on such articles,” since
they will “command a proportional price.” Neither would the
imposition of a duty thwart the revenue-raising purpose of the
proposed excise. Since Hamilton anticipated any decrease in
consumption to be in a small degree, it would not “frustrate the
expected benefit to the revenue from raising the duties.”
Hamilton and his allies also argued that distilled spirits had
become a threat to public health. Despite the evident inconsistency between Hamilton’s assertion that liquor is a luxury good,
and his claims in the same Report … of Public Credit that “The
consumption of ardent spirits… [is] very much on account of
their cheapness,” Hamilton presented a letter to Congress from
the Philadelphia College of Physicians that claimed, “domestic
distilled spirits, the cheap drink of the laboring classes, had
become a ravaging plague requiring immediate treatment” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 63]. In his Report … of Public Credit, Hamilton
calls spirits a “pernicious luxury” and a source of national impoverishment. “The consumption of ardent spirits… is carried
to an extreme, which is truly to be regretted, as well in regard to
the health and the morals, as to the economy of the community.” Consequently, any decrease in consumption of spirits “would
be, in every respect desirable.” This is in clear contradiction to
his argument that demand would be inelastic and, therefore, the
desired additional revenues would be maintained. But this argument proved to be effective, winning-over the perpetual thorn in
Published by eGrove, 2013
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his side, James Madison. Madison thought a tax on spirits may
have useful societal benefits, since it would increase “sobriety
and thereby prevent disease and untimely deaths” [Madison,
1981, p. 366].
On top of the argument that distilled spirits are price-inelastic luxury goods, and the seemingly conflicting argument that
liquor is a cheap and pernicious threat to public health, Hamilton also advocated for the excise tax on the basis that it would
benefit agriculture by encouraging “the substitution of cyder
and malt liquors,” with the consequent opening of a “new and
productive source of revenue” [Hamilton, 1790]. The suggestion that cider and malt liquor would be popular substitutes for
distilled spirits makes the price-inelasticity argument somewhat
specious. More questionable, though, is the argument that agriculture would benefit from the new duty, since “the excise first
fell most heavily on the frontier farmers” [Reid, 1979], an effect
that ultimately manifested in the Whiskey Rebellion.
Whether or not the members of Congress bought Hamilton’s
convoluted public health, luxury tax, or other explanations (and
many of them did), they really had no other option but to sign
off on the revenue bill that instituted the federal excise. The
United States had a legal obligation to pay back debts to lenders
who had bought bonds during the American Revolution. The
only way to meet these debts was either to impose an excise
tax or to resort to even more unpopular direct measures like a
land tax, an income tax, or a wealth tax3 [Hogeland, 2006, p.
63]. Madison brought considerable support to the excise tax on
domestic spirits, insisting, “as direct taxes would be still more
generally obnoxious and as imports are already loaded as far as
they will bear, an excise is the only resource and of all articles
distilled spirits are least objectionable” [Madison, 1981, p. 344].
It was on this foundation that Congress passed, in early
1791, An Act Repealing, after the Last Day of June Next, the Duties
Heretofore Laid upon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and
Laying Others in their Stead, and Also upon Spirits Distilled within the United States and for Appropriating the Same [U.S. Senate
Journal, February 10, 1791; U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 338 – 355].
This Whiskey Tax act (the Act) passed in the House on January
3
“Direct” taxes are those paid directly by an individual to the taxing entity,
such as a real estate or income tax. Indirect taxes, such as sales taxes, may be
shifted to an intermediate entity. Tariffs are duties on imported goods, while an
excise tax is on goods produced within the borders.
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27, 1791, by a vote of 35 yeas to 21 nays, passed the Senate on
February 12, 1791, by a vote of 20 to 5, and was signed by the
President on March 3, 1791 [U.S. Senate, 1911, pp. 337 – 338].
In both the House and the Senate, Pennsylvania delegate votes
were split equally, giving no hint of the trouble to come.
The duties on distilled spirits were quite costly. Most expensive were the taxes on liquors distilled domestically from
imported molasses and sugar, primarily rum. Those “more than
40 per cent above proof,” were taxed at 30 cents per gallon. Between 20 and 40 percent above proof the taxes were 20 cents per
gallon, with decreases in the tax commensurate with reduced
alcohol level down to those spirits “more than 10 per cent below
proof,” which bore a tax of 11 cents per gallon. Spirits distilled
domestically from local crops benefited from a slightly lower tax
burden, ranging from 25 cents per gallon for 40 per cent above
proof to 9 cents per gallon for the lowest proof products. At a
time when the average wage was less than twenty-five cents per
day for the small number of people who earned actual wages
(David and Solar, 1977), the tax on spirits amounted to as much
as a full day’s wages per gallon.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF THE WHISKEY TAX
The tax on whiskey was particularly economically burdensome to the people of the western frontier. In the early 1790s,
the United States could not come to an agreement with Spain
to open the Mississippi River to trade, and thus the Mississippi
River remained closed to American shipping. “The Mississippi
problem robbed westerners of chances for the small-scale commercial development through which they longed to free themselves from depression, barter economies, and dependency on
landlords and creditors” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 56]. Without the
use of the Mississippi for easy shipping, the farmers of western
Pennsylvania were forced to turn their grain into whiskey. The
substantial reduction in volume resulting from the distillation
of grain into whiskey greatly reduced the cost to transport their
crops to the populous east coast – the only place where there
were markets for their crops. More than one fourth of the whiskey stills in the United States were located at the forks of the
Ohio River in western Pennsylvania [Hogeland, 2006, p. 70], and
those families were hit the hardest by the Whiskey Excise tax.
The farmers at the western frontier were disproportionately
likely to sell their crops as alcohol rather than grain, so were
more likely to have to pay the new excise tax. Additionally, the
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transportation costs per gallon were much higher for those
farmers at the frontier, so the per-gallon profit was reduced
disproportionately by the per-gallon tax. This was a tax on distillation, not on consumption, so the tax was borne by the farmer
not by the customer. As a result, the Whiskey Excise taxed rural
frontier farmers unfairly compared to those who lived in more
convenient places where they were closer to an eastern commercial center.
The fact that this was a tax on distillation created other
problems. Section 17 of the Act required that the duties be paid
before the liquor was removed from the distillery, with a tax
abatement of 2 cents for every 10 gallons.
FIGURE 1
Receipt for Payment of $23.10 in Excise Tax on Stills June –
FIGURE
1
August, 1795. Receipt signed
by Tax
Inspector John Hughes
Receipt for Payment of $23.10 in Excise Tax on
Stills June – August, 1795. Receipt signed by Tax
rd
District).
(Pennsylvania
3 Survey
District).
Inspector
John Hughes (Pennsylvania
3rd Survey

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

For those distillers who were unable to make the payment, a
three-month surety bond4 was an option.
Anyone caught with a cask of spirits for which the tax certificate could not be produced were subject to seizure and forfeiture, not only of the casks, but also of their horses or cattle,
carts, harness, tackle, and any other vessels or boats that may be
in use. As such, the farmers had to pay the taxes prior to taking
their goods to market or risk losing everything. Section 21 of the
Act also imposed an annual tax on stills of 60 cents per gallon of
4
Given the economic conditions at the time, these bonds are likely to have
borne a very high interest rate, but no contemporaneous data were found.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss2/5

8

Krom and Krom: Whiskey tax of 1791 and the consequent insurrection: A Wicked and happy tumult
Krom and Krom, The Whiskey Tax of 1791

99

capacity. The still duty was to be paid “half yearly,” in January
and July. Non-payment could result in forfeiture and sale of all
personal goods.
FIGURE 2
Image of a "Promise to Pay" Tax Inspector John Hughes
(Pennsylvania 3rd Survey District)
an outstanding debt for
FIGURE 2
rd
$64.15
whiskey
dated
August
2, 1797,3and
signed
Survey
District) by
an
Image of ain
“Promise
to Pay”taxes
Tax Inspector
John
Hughes (Pennsylvania
outstanding debt for $64.15 in whiskey taxes dated August 2, 1797, and signed by Joseph Stevenson
Joseph Stevenson
in
the
presence
of
witnesses
Christian
Riddle
in the presence of witnesses Christian Riddle and James Mitchel.
and James Mitchel.

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

In addition to the onerous taxes were burdensome recordkeeping requirements. Sections 24 and 35 mandate a daily log
book, or accounts book, indicating the quantity of spirits distilled, the quantity sold, and inventory on hand. For uneducated,
often illiterate, frontier farmers, record keeping was an arduous,
if not impossible, task. Failure to keep the daily record, whether
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through negligence or refusal, carried a penalty of $100 [Section
35]. Detailed requirements for signage and public notice were
also specified.
FIGURE 3

FIGURE 3:

Image
of aofStill
Tax
Certificate
to James
JamesMitchell
Mitchell
dated
Image
a Still
Tax
Certificategranted
granted to
dated
January 2, 1802, licensing
January
2, 1802,
licensing
to operate
two stills.
Signedofby
operate
two stills.
Signedhim
by Peter
Muhlenberg,
Supervisor
the Revenue for the Distric
Peter Muhlenberg, Supervisor of the Revenue
for the District of
Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania.

Source:
Tax Tax
receipts
records
at National
Archives.
Source:
receipts
records
at National
Archives.

A number of sections describe the powers of inspecting officers, including their right to enter any relevant building and
inspect at all times in the daytime, and the right to sample or
taste any goods. Penalties for using mismarked casks, or defacing inspector’s marks on casks, were very high at $100 per cask
[Sections 30 and 31]. Counterfeit or altered certificates carried a
penalty of $500 per certificate [Section 45].
The Whiskey Excise had a disparate impact on the poorest
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol40/iss2/5
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people of western Pennsylvania who used whiskey as a commodity with which to barter. The people of the frontier were
cash-poor “accomplished monetary innovators” [Sylla, 2006,
p. 76] who relied on whiskey as a means of payment – laborers usually were paid in a portion of the grain they harvested
and landlords took whiskey as rent payment. Indeed, many of
the families on the frontier would never see cash money in the
course of a decade [Bouton, 2007], relying completely on a barter and subsistence economy. Barter was the tool that kept rural
people free of debt and dependency [Hogeland, 2006, p. 67].
Even in more developed regions of Pennsylvania there was “an
extreme scarcity of circulating specie” causing farmers to sign
petitions and condemn state officials [Carlisle Gazette, 1788, p. 1;
York County Petition, 1784]. In Pennsylvania, a dominant part
of the post-Revolution experience was a “profound scarcity of
money and credit,” resulting in property foreclosure, unpaid private debts and public taxes, and the misery of losing everything
one owned including mattresses, mugs, and spoons as well as
the items needed to make a living [Bouton, 2000]. By 1790, the
circulation of money had dropped to only 31 cents per person,
in contrast to the $5.33 per person during the “currency shortage” of the Revolutionary War [State of the Finances…, 1790].
Despite the critical shortage of cash, and the prevalence of
the barter economy particularly in rural areas, whiskey could
not be tendered in payment of the excise tax – it was required
to be paid in cash, which was an inconceivable hardship [Hogeland, 2006, p. 68]. “Without money, or the means of procuring
it, consuming their whiskey only in their families or using it as
a system of barter, which, though in some respects answered the
place of money, yet would not be received in pay for the excise
tax, they thought it hard to pay as much tax on what sold with
them but at from two shillings and six pence, as they did where
it brought double that price” [Findlay, 1985, p. 79]. Thus, the
Whiskey Tax was not the “mere luxury-tax-with-concomitanthealth-benefit” that Hamilton presented to Congress. The demand for cash payment seems to contradict Hamilton’s [1787]
own declaration that the ability of citizens to pay taxes “must always be proportioned…to the quantity of money in circulation,
and the celerity with which it circulates.”
By taxing the only feasible source of income for frontier
families the Whiskey Excise Tax may have effectively functioned
as the nation’s first income tax. Compounding the effect of the
Whiskey Tax was the actual experience of taxation, which was
unfamiliar to Pennsylvanians. Unlike people in other states,
Published by eGrove, 2013
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“Pennsylvanians were unused to paying taxes, as the state had
hitherto financed itself almost exclusively through land sales”
[Edling, 2003]. This onerous taxation of farmers in western
Pennsylvania stands in clear contrast to the preferential tax
treatment received by farmers since the passage of the Revenue
Act of 1913 imposing the federal income tax [Barney and Flesher, 2008]. Likewise, the disparate effect of this tax on poor frontier farmers violated the arguments advanced in the 19th century
suggesting that an income tax was the most equitable form of
taxation, since an income tax “does not impinge upon the limit
of subsistence of those possessing but small incomes, as do the
customs and excise taxes” [Howe, 1894]. Thus, the Whiskey Excise Tax “redistributed wealth by working itself deeply into rural
people’s peculiar economic relationship with whiskey” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 64].
Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a first-hand observer of the
impact and consequences of the Whiskey Excise Tax, noted
that the worst element of the federal excise was its method of
enforcement. Delinquent distillers who could not pay the federal
tax collectors were given trials – a fact that Hamilton used to
convince Congress that this tax was not like classic excises that
had infringed liberties. However, these trials were not conducted
in local courts but in the federal court in Philadelphia, which is
about three hundred miles from the homes and farms of western Pennsylvanians. Distillers who could not pay the cash excise
would be compelled to travel to Philadelphia at the sacrifice of
their farms and the ruin of their families [Slaughter, 1986]. The
trip to Philadelphia was long and arduous. The expense of the
trip was nearly equal to the value of their homesteads [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 67], and the families left behind at the frontier
were exposed to many dangers including Indian invasion. Since
one of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence was
that England took persons “beyond Seas” for trial, the requirement of travel to Philadelphia likewise added insult to injury.
GENERAL NEVILLE, THE INDIAN PROBLEM, AND
WESTYLVANIA
In the spring of 1791, General John Neville was appointed
to enforce and collect the Whiskey Tax in western Pennsylvania.
Neville was an ambitious, wealthy large-scale distiller. He
was an English Episcopalian from Virginia in an area of western
Pennsylvania where the vast majority of residents were ScotsIrish or German Presbyterians and Quakers. He and his Virgin-
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ian aristocratic wife, Winifred Oldham, built their mansion on
top of a hill on ten thousand acres in western Pennsylvania,
calling it Bower Hill. It was “the fanciest home in that part of
the west” and one of the only homes that was large and wealthy
enough to own slaves (and not Quaker) [Hogeland, 2006, p. 99].
FIGURE 4

Cover of "Abstract of duties arising on Country Stills employed
in distilling spirits from domestic materials under the
FIGURE 4:
management of John Neville, Inspector of the 4th Survey dist.
Cover of “Abstract
of 30
duties
Country
Stills employed in distilli
of Pennsylvania.
Year ending
Junearising
1794." on
The
notation
materials
under
the
management
of
John
Neville,
Inspector of the 4th Surv
th
for the five divisions within the 4 district (most of western
Year indicates
ending 30$39,379.12
June 1794.”
notation
for the
five divisions within the 4
Pennsylvania)
in The
whiskey
tax was
collected
Pennsylvania)
indicates
$39,379.12
in
whiskey
tax was collected d
during the year..

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.
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FIGURE 5
Inside summary of "Abstract of duties arising on Country Stills
employed in distilling spirits from domestic materials under
the management of John Nevill for the fourth Survey in the
District of Pennsylvania, commencing July the 1st, 1793 and
5:
ending June the 30th 1794." FIGURE
The notation
for the five divisions
Inside summary of
th“Abstract of duties arising on Country Stills employed in distilling spirits from
within
4 under
district
(most of
western
indicates
domesticthe
materials
the management
of John
Nevill forPennsylvania)
the fourth Survey in the
District of
Pennsylvania,
commencing
July the 1st,
1793
and ending
June the during
30th 1794.” The
$40,056.12
in whiskey
tax
was
collected
thenotation
year,forinthe
th
five divisions within the 4 district (most of western Pennsylvania) indicates $40,056.12 in whiskey
contrast
to the
in Figure
4 covering
the same
time
tax was collected
duringdocument
the year, in contrast
to the document
in Figure 4 covering
the same
time
same geographic
geographic area. area.
period period
and and
same

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

Source: Tax receipts records at National Archives.

The “Neville Connection” was General Neville’s family
business – a conglomerate of industrial, mercantile, and social
interests with business centered in Pittsburgh. The Neville Connection worked in conjunction with other powerful families of
the area to run ironworks and boatyards, broker deals, and grow
grain on large plots of land. The Neville Connection essentially
monopolized any business with which it was interested.
Pittsburgh was staging area for military expeditions against
the Indians in 1791 and 1792. The Neville Connection seized
the new market for food, drink, and supplies that had landed
in its lap, and largely dominated buying and selling at the army
garrison [Hogeland, 2006, p. 101]. Whiskey was one of the most
essential products to supply to an army, and Neville leaped at
the
	
   chance to sell his whiskey to the army at a high cost. As the
25	
  
excise tax collector, Neville strictly enforced the Whiskey Excise
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to make sure that no illegal whiskey from smaller distilleries
got into the hands of the army, benefiting his personal business
interests as well as following orders from Washington. In addition to dominating the whiskey-supply market in Pittsburgh,
the Act specified that Neville collected a $450 annual salary and
a 1% commission from all of the taxes he collected from his
neighbors. It is easy to understand, then, why Neville was not
well-liked by small-scale whiskey distillers. Aside from the fact
that he was the enforcer of the dreaded Whiskey Excise, he was
also a shrewd businessman who used his power and influence
to sure-up permanent markets and to push out small-scale businesses from the Pittsburgh area.
While the appointment of General Neville was a vexation, the “Indian Problem” helped propel the frontiersmen to
insurrection. The settlers of western Pennsylvania had ongoing interactions with the Indians of the region, most of which
were bloody and violent on both sides. “An afternoon trip to
church or town could become a scene of butchery. At night a
cabin could be abruptly filled with whooping warriors, swinging children by their feet to open their skulls, slicing limbs and
taking scalps, disappearing into the woods with wailing captives” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 56]. England supported these western
Indian tribes and amplified the harassment of the American
settlers5 [Anonymous, 1847, Chapter XI]. The people of western
Pennsylvania looked to the federal and state governments to assist them in keeping the Indians at bay, but neither government
seemed concerned with the plight of the rural frontier settlers,
partly because these same rural settlers rarely voted [Hogeland,
2006, p. 54]. Additionally, Virginia and Pennsylvania constantly
fought over who owned the western territory – both tried to
collect taxes and issued competing land titles to former squatters and absentee speculators [Barksdale, 2003]. “Having two
governments was tantamount to having none,” and the region of
western Pennsylvania went largely without government throughout the late-eighteenth century [Hogeland, 2006, p. 15].
As a response to the lack of government aid or attention,
many settlers in western Pennsylvania began to talk of a single
independent western state, which they called “Westylvania,” de5
The Proclamation of 1763, in which England prohibited colonists from settling further west than the Appalachian Mountains, drew many Delaware Indians
in Ohio to side with the British during the Revolutionary War. These “British
Indians” feared (correctly) that they would have to relinquish their land due to
western expansion if the Colonists won [Hurt, 1996].
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spite a state law that made it a capital crime to discuss independence. Though illegal, in western Pennsylvania, and particularly
in Washington County, citizens held meetings about the Westylvania movement and created committees of correspondence to
communicate with settlers in Kentucky and western Virginia
who would also make up the state of Westylvania. Kentucky
even held a convention to discuss Westylvania in response to a
circular letter out of the western Pennsylvania meeting [Slaughter, 1986].
INSURRECTION
Talk of secession added to the rural insurgency activities in
post-Revolution Pennsylvania. Beginning in 1787, on at least 62
occasions, Pennsylvania farmers created formidable obstructions making roads impassable for many months at a time [Bouton, 2000, p. 855]. The passage of the excise tax brought immediate protests, with a fierce anti-excise meeting held in July
1791 in Brownsville, Pennsylvania, led by Colonel Edward Cook
and Albert Gallatin. That meeting resulted in the publication of
a set of “resolutions expressing the sense of their constituents on
the subject of the excise law” in the Pittsburgh Gazette [Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 22 – 23]. Formal anti-excise conventions were
held in Pittsburgh in September 1791 and again in July 1794,
resulting in a petition in the form of a circular letter and general
address to the neighboring counties in Pennsylvania. This circular letter was part English/colonial rhetoric on infringement of
liberty and part full of new “western”/frontier rhetoric insisting
that the excise tax favored the rich and hit westerners hardest.
Peaceful protest was paralleled by a series of violent acts. In
September 1791 the excise officer for Washington and Allegheny
counties, Robert Johnson, was tarred and feathered6 and left for
dead [Clouse, 1991, pp. 27 – 28]. In August of 1792, Captain William Faulker was attacked because he had allowed his house to
serve as an office of inspection for the Inspector of Revenue in
Washington County [Hamilton, 1792]. In April 1793 the home
of Fayette County excise officer Benjamin Wells was burned (he
was also tarred and feathered that fall), followed by the June
tarring and feathering of John Lynn, deputy Westmoreland
6
While often discounted as merely a form of public humiliation, this practice
could have dire consequences. The victim was either dunked in hot tar or pine
pitch, or had it poured/painted over him, and was then rolled in feathers. This resulted in burns over most of the body, and removal of the tar ripped skin and often
required the use of kerosene or turpentine. Infrequently, death from overheating
or ensuing infection could occur [The Effects of Varnishing the Skin, 1877].
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County excise officer [Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 28 – 30]. Mob
violence extended into neighboring counties in Virginia (modern
West Virginia), including a siege in Morgantown, which briefly
became the national fulcrum for anti-excise tax activity [Barksdale, 2003, p. 8].
In a particularly unfortunate incident in October 1791, a
mob attacked Robert Wilson, an obviously cognitively disabled
man (Alexander Hamilton calls him “an unhappy man” who was
“manifestly disordered in his intellects”) who had made inquiries about the various whiskey stills in town [Hamilton, 1794, p.
35]. It seems that Wilson imagined himself to be a clandestine
agent sent to recover information for the Treasury Department,
but he was not a spy nor was he connected with the government in any way. Unfortunately, Wilson’s imaginary position as
government auditor fooled the people of western Pennsylvania,
and he became the target of an attack carried-out by a blackfaced gang. They took Wilson out of his bed and marched him
five miles away to a blacksmith’s shop, where they stripped him
naked and prodded him with the blacksmith’s hot iron, which
burned him in several places, before they tarred and feathered
him [Hamilton, 1794, p. 35]. Sadly, Wilson’s dedication to his
imaginary position was such that he refused to renounce the tax
or ask for mercy “no matter how horrific the pain” [Hogeland,
2006, p. 104]. Because Wilson was not actually affiliated with
the government, despite his willingness to die for their cause,
he had no one to take his grievances to or to report this harassment to. Alexander Hamilton used the attack on “the unhappy
sufferer” as proof that Daniel Hamilton’s gang was ruthless and
was willing to target even those who were not affiliated with the
excise. However, it is clear that the mob of frontiersmen were
convinced that Wilson was involved with the government and
were not just randomly harassing innocent men.
A dramatic meeting was held at Mingo Creek in July 1794,
with Major General David Bradford rising to lead the incensed
farmers. The Mingo Creek Association and the local militias
demonstrated the new nature of their “mob” – large, organized,
armed, and militant. The Mingo Creek Association and their
militias numbered 600 rebels in a formal muster at the Bower
Hill manor of General Neville, “Chief Inspector of the Revenue”
[Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 46 – 49]. “No blackface now, no wild
disguise. This wouldn’t be a raid by a gang but an expedition
by a large, disciplined fighting force, mobilized without order
from any legal authority, offering to do battle with a division of
the U.S. Army” [Hogeland, 2006, p. 151]. The battle at Bower
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Hill was not a small act of mob violence but an all-out war. Both
sides opened fire in earnest; gunfire raged at Bower Hill and
the ad-hoc army of rebels made a massive bonfire of General
Neville’s furniture and belongings (igniting it, ironically, with
the General’s whiskey). There was only one casualty of the battle
at Bower Hill – Captain James McFarlane, a local hero of the
American Revolution militia who served as the leader of the
Whiskey Rebels’ Bower Hill operation. McFarlane was probably
shot accidentally when he came out from behind a tree [Hogeland, 2006, p. 151 – 154].
Not all still owners embraced the burgeoning violence.
Drawing attention to those not joining the “expedition against
that insolent exciseman John Neville”, “Tom the Tinker” placed
a series of advertisements in The Pittsburgh Gazette and other
newspapers. Though his true identity is subject to debate, Tom
the Tinker specifically named John Reed of Washington (PA)
who “came not forth in the suppression of the execution of said
law.” The advertisements threatened that non-supporters “will
be deemed as enemies” and threatened “punishment according
to the nature of the offence” [Tom the Tinker, 1794].
A few weeks later, in August, 1794, delegates from Pennsylvania and West Virginia held a large gathering at the Jean Bonnet Tavern, near modern Bedford, Pennsylvania, and erected a
large liberty pole inscribed “Liberty and no Excise! No Asylum
for Traitors and Cowards!” Lead by Albert Gallatin, Edward
Cook, and Hugh Henry Brakenridge, this gathering had two
principal objectives – to organize tax resistance and to draft a
definitive anti-tax declaration [Brackenridge, 1859, pp. 157 –
172]. By the end of August, “western Pennsylvania’s Whiskey
Rebels had their own flags, their own army, and their own martyr: Captain James McFarlane” [Barcousky, 2008].
THE “WATERMELON ARMY” OR “ARMY OF THE WESTERN
EXPEDITION”
Initially, national leaders generally presented the protests
to the Whiskey Excise as “exaggerated responses to so inconsequential a tax on whiskey” [Slaughter, 1985, p. 10] and “intemperate” [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 263]. Those who took issue
with the excise were considered to reflect the “paranoid style
affecting politics at the time” [Slaughter, 1985, p. 10]. Although
economic principles mattered to the people of western Pennsylvania, the tax itself was almost definitely not enough to incite
violence. According to Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a first-hand
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observer, “The major cause of violence resistance had nothing
directly to do with the excise tax itself” [Brackenridge, 1859, p.
30] but was primarily due to the horrible penalties imposed for
non-payment and the unavailability of the currency required to
make the payments.
By the end of summer in 1794, however, the extent of the
rebellion required serious attention. Alexander Hamilton published, under the name “Tully,” a series of letters denouncing the
insurgents as enemies to the Constitution and to all orderly government [Hamilton Works]. Finally, President Washington called
out the troops, stating that he would not permit “a small portion
of the United States [to] dictate to the whole union” [Washington, 1794]. Nearly 13,000 soldiers – infantry, cavalry, and artillery – assembled to quell the rebellion [Baldwin, 1939, p. 225].
Remarkably, troops from each participating state were led by
their state governor: Governor Mifflin (PA), Governor Henry Lee
(VA), Governor Thomas Lee (MD), and Governor Howell (NJ).
Even more extraordinarily, Washington himself commanded the
army, widely considered the singular instance in which a sitting
President of the United States led troops into battle. Whether
due to the “rough conditions,” as some critics claim, or to judicious politics, as other historians assert, Washington turned
back after rallying the troops in Bedford, Pennsylvania (at or
near the aforementioned Jean Bonnet Tavern) [Baldwin, 1939,
p. 229].
Horrible torrential downpours slowed the army, allowing
time for the rebellion leaders to consider their response. Ultimately, cooler heads prevailed, and the bloodshed was minimal.
“There was no resistance, either to the military or civil authority” [Brackenridge, 1859, p. 312]. However, hundreds of rebels
were arrested, and generally treated poorly despite the amnesty
that was promised. Accounts of the prisoners taken at Mingo
Creek included placement in a cold, wet basement with neither
food nor drink, followed by a twelve-mile march [Brackenridge,
1859, p. 320 – 321]. Most prisoners were eventually released by
General Lee, acting under the President’s authority, despite their
participation in the “wicked and unhappy tumults and disturbances lately existing” [Lee, 1794], but about twenty key players
were subjected to military tribunals. Several men were sentenced to hang, although President Washington first reprieved,
and then pardoned them [Baldwin, 1939, pp. 257 – 264], with
the exception of the prominent leader Daniel Bradford. Bradford escaped to Spanish-controlled New Orleans, but was
pardoned by President John Adams in March 1799 [Hoover, unPublished by eGrove, 2013
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dated]. Several thousand men were temporarily exiled to lands
farther west, where many chose to make a permanent residence.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Whiskey Insurrection failed, but manifested
long coattails. Other economic forces, primarily the growth of
large distillers, doomed the small distiller, many of whom pulled
up their roots and headed to Kentucky and Tennessee (hotbeds
of whiskey distilling even today). However, commerce and industry in western Pennsylvania grew dramatically, in part due
to the presence of the army and the currency it injected into circulation. Within the decade, the Pittsburgh area was “launched
on a course that was eventually to make it the ‘workshop of the
world’” [Baldwin, 1939, p. 265].
Likewise, the insurrection gave support to Federalist calls
for a standing army of the U.S., and probably influenced the
elections of 1794 and 1796 at the very least. The Federalists
controlled the White House and most of Congress through the
presidencies of George Washington (1789 – 1797) and John
Adams (1797 – 1801), during which excise taxes were limited
“almost exclusively to goods and services consumed by the affluent” [Brownlee, 2006, p. 7], including wines, distilled spirits,
sugar, carriages, vellum, parchment and paper. The Whiskey
Tax became a critical issue in the tight presidential election of
1800, when Thomas Jefferson tied Aaron Burr in the Electoral
College [Tally of the Electoral Votes…, 1801] and only won in the
House of Representatives after 36 ballots over 6 days [Jefferson
Victorious, 2010]. At the time of the election, it was conventional
wisdom that “’the whisky drinkers’ had made Jefferson president” [Simon, 2012]. The Whiskey Tax and all other internal
taxes were repealed on April 6, 1802 after Thomas Jefferson
took office as president [U.S. Senate Journal, 1802]. Jefferson’s
signature also abolished all tax collection offices and the Supervisor of the Internal Revenue [An Act to Repeal the Internal
Taxes, 1802], making it understandably popular.
As the first tax on a domestically produced product, the
Whiskey Excise was an important development in the financing
of the debt and operations of the federal government. Though
officially an excise on distillation, for the vast majority of frontier farmers it effectively served as a tax on their only source
of income, particularly as payment in coin was required. An
argument can surely be made that the Whiskey Excise may have
effectively functioned as the first U.S. direct income tax, more
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than a half-century before the formal income tax briefly enacted
to finance the Civil War. The events surrounding the Whiskey
Excise Tax also presaged the social cleavage between the new
industrial/mercantile “city slickers” and the “hicks from the
sticks.”
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